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Cultural Projects and Structural Transformation 
in the Canadian Legal Profession1 
 
 
by W. Wesley Pue 
Nemetz Professor of Legal History 
Faculty of Law, 
University of British Columbia 
 
 
[this is a pre-publication version of a paper subsequently published in LAWYERS AND VAMPIRES: CULTURAL HISTORIES OF LEGAL 
PROFESSIONS, details of which appear at the end of the essay] 
 
 
The problem of state power ... is a problem of how to distill a `single will - or 
rather, the constitution of a unitary, singular body animated by the spirit of 
sovereignty - from the particular wills of a multiplicity of individuals'. 
... 
The ultimate end of government is not the achievement of a coexistence of 
autonomous sovereignties, but the production of a happy, healthy, virile and 
integrated social body. 
         - Anne Barron, 19902 
 
A group of lawyers met in a small, dusty railway town in cattle-country east of the Rocky 
Mountains in the spring of 1899.  Their meeting established the Calgary Bar Association, 
reflecting their consensus,  
that the Bar of Calgary were sufficiently numerous to form an association for the purpose 
of cultivating a feeling of professional brotherhood, discussing various matters affecting 
the interests of the profession and taking united action thereon.....3 
The matters most urgently in need of collective action, they thought, were the 
development of a conveyancing tariff, agreement on uniform office hours, and confronting the 
problem of "unlicenced conveyancers".  I wish to demonstrate that such objectives were integrally 
                                                           
1
  This paper draws on research supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Legal Research Institute, 
University of Manitoba, and the University of British Columbia.  I am grateful for the advice, encouragement or assistance of colleagues at the 
University of Manitoba (Professors Anderson, Esau, Gibson, Harvey, McGillivray in particular) and elsewhere (L. Gibson, A. Diduck, T. 
Halliday, L. Karpik, L. Spelman, D. Sugarman and R. McQueen), and to excellent research assistants (B. Williams, J. Bermel, M. McVicar, and 
J. Bliss).  Thanks are due also, to archivists and officials who facilitated access to significant records at the Law Societies of Manitoba, Alberta, 
British Columbia and Ontario, the Alberta Legal Heritage Society, and the Glenbow Institite.  The University of Adelaide provided an 
outstanding environment for research and writing during my term as Distinguished Visiting Professor in History, Law and British Studies from 
May to September, 1999. 
2
  Anne Barron, "Legal Discourse and the Colonisation of the Self in the Modern State" in Anthony Carty, ed., Post-Modern Law: 
Enlightenment, Revolution and the Death of Man (Edinburgh U. Pr., 1990), 107-125, at 108 and 117.  
3
  Minute Book of the Calgary Bar Association, dated May 12, 1899 (Glenbow Institute) 
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related to the project of government sketched out by Anne Barron in the introductory 
quotation.The Calgary Bar Association, in common with the Canadian Bar Association and 
similar bodies, participated in professional projects oriented toward creating the preconditions for 
effective state governance in a land which was, in principle, ungovernable. 
From some viewpoints the lawyers' projects discussed in this essay seem to provide 
inauspicious origins for organized professionalism, even in the cowboy capital of British Empire.  
Whereas professional rhetoric makes much of public service - sometimes elevating professional 
self-governance to the status of an entrenched constitutional "right"4 -  the nitty-gritty of  
professional organization seems to have been self-interest.  Their specific objectives were classic 
trades-union stuff:  money, work-week and monopoly.  From one viewpoint this hints of 
professional conspiracy against clients, community and state.   
Alluring though it may be, such interpretations dreadfully caricature processes of 
professionalization.  I wish to interrogate the history of the "professionalization" of Canadian 
lawyers in order to develop broader understandings of professionalism and lawyers alike.  There 
is more here than meets the eye. 
The novelty of lawyers' professionalism 
Lawyers west of Ontario spearheaded the movement which created modern professional 
forms in Canada.  Although historical antecedents of some sort exist for every "innovation", this 
is almost entirely a twentieth Century story.  The forms and cultures of the professionalism we 
experience did not exist anywhere before the twentieth Century.5  The high water mark of 
European Imperialism, the spatial extension of both the U.S.A. and the Canadian Dominion, and 
the creation of modern professional structures occured simultaneously.  Each process affected the 
others. 
                                                           
4
  I have reviewed such arguments in "In Pursuit of Better Myth: Lawyers' Histories and Histories of Lawyers", 33(4) Alberta Law Review 
(1995), 730-767. 
5
  I do not wish to be taken as making the nonsense argument that "professionalism" or "professions" did not exist in earlier times, only that 
twentieth century Canadian professionalism is distinctive in its forms, manifestations, and cultures.  Earlier forms of professionalism are also to 
be treated seriously in their own right: see Wilfrid Prest, ed., The Professions in Early Modern England (London: Croom Helm, 1987). 
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In it's paradigmatic expression professionalism incorporates demanding admission 
standards, mandatory and extended formal education, examinations, admissions screening, state 
licencing, prohibitions on "unauthorized" practice, self-regulation, written "codes" of conduct and 
technocratic or meritocratic culture.  In its peculiar combinations and in its relationship to a 
culture which was being consumed by "galloping hegemony of instrumental reason", all this is 
very much part of larger twentieth century phenomenon.6  The whole, distinctly greater than the 
sum of its parts, combined in our grandparents' and great-grandparents' generations to form the 
core "structures" or forms of contemporary professionalism.7  North American professionalism 
was a new social technology for new times. 
Noting this suggests the importance of several oft-overlooked themes.  Most obviously, 
the novelty of contemporary professional form deserves greater emphasis than it is generally 
accorded.  This is particularly so in the case of the legal profession.  Because "law" is obviously 
an "ancient" profession the suggestion that some essence of the existing profession might be of 
recent origin strikes many as very nearly heretical.  Understandings of lawyers' professionalism in 
Canada and in other "British Diaspora" lands (including the United States) characteristically 
assume that, although much changes in professional culture, the essential forms or structures have 
a timeless quality about them.  The distilled "essence" of professionalism - corporate structures, 
codes of ethics, effective "self-regulation", rigorous training programmes and admissions 
standards - are often assumed to have existed since time immemorial, only relatively 
inconsequential matters of "detail" changing over the generations.  Not infrequently, key features 
                                                           
6
  Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity (Concord, Ontario: House of Anansi, 1991) 112 (and on the nature of instrumental reason see 5-6). 
     cf. the tracings-out of professionalism provided by Harold Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880 (London: Routledge, 
1989), James C. Foster, The Ideology of Apolitical Politics: Elite Lawyers' Response to the Legitimation Crisis of American Capitalism, 1870-
1920, (N.Y.: Garland Publishing "Distinguished Studies in American Constitutional and Legal History," second series, 1990), Jerold S. 
Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1976), Andrew Abbott, The System 
of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).  cf. Dorothy Ross, The Origins of 
American Social Science (Cambridge U.P., 1990); John McLaren & Hamar Foster "Hard Choices and Sharp Edges: the Legal History of British 
Columbia and the Yukon" in Foster and McLaren, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Vol. VI: British Columbia and the Yukon, Ch. 1, 
3-27 at 18-19.   
7
  I invoke this convenient and commonsensical understanding of professional "structures" in order to avoid the necessity of taking on the full-
blown debate as to what, precisely, constitutes "structure" in social analysis.  My work-a-day approach to professional structures in the twentieth 
century seems to fit Sewell's definition that "Sets of schemas and resources may properly be said to constitute structures only when they mutually 
imply and sustain each other over time": William Sewell, "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation" American Journal of 
Sociology 98 (1992), 1-29, at 13. 
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are traced back through presumed genealogies to mysterious origins at the English Inns of Court 
in a time before recorded professional history.  A heavy overlay of myth needs to be peeled back 
if the cultural origin of professionalism in our age is to be understood.8 
Structures and cultures of legal professionalism 
The second theme is more complex.  Broadly, it is that professional forms themselves 
need to be understood as cultural artifacts, that "culture" and "structure" are properly understood 
as mutually constitutive, not as distinct forces.  There is no "base", no bedrock professional core 
which is unmoved by the currents of time.  Equally, there is no superstructure, no 
"determination", no "overdetermination".  The case study of Canadian legal professionalism adds 
support to the "general theoretical argument that conceptual distinctions between structure and 
culture have lost force and utility in providing compelling theoretical maps, accounts, and images 
of the social world."9  Amongst many possible ways of understanding the relationships between 
culture and form, I wish to canvass four, for convenience labelled "structural determinism", 
"disengagement", "metasomatism" and "cultural efficacy".   
Structural determinist understandings treat structures as timeless (or, in a more modest 
version, as immutable over the longue durée) and assume that structures determine the essential 
features of professional culture.  Conversely, approaches based on some notion of disengagement 
between the two spheres perceive professional culture as dynamic and important whereas 
professional form is thought of as static, unchanging - and hence rather uninteresting.  Structural 
determinism sees professional culture as mere epiphenomena, barely noteworthy.  On the other 
hand, research premised on the assumption of disengagement commits an opposite error, tending 
to focus exclusively on the most visible forms of cultural change - such as the poetry, plays, 
books, classroom dynamics, politics, sporting activities or the homosociability of gentlemen 
lawyers - without taking structure seriously into account. 
                                                           
8
  See Pue, "Better Myth", Op. Cit.  Sewell, Op. Cit., addresses the ways in which actors often falsely invoke history in order to effect 
transformation.  See also Eric Hobshawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
9Lyn Spillman, "How are structures meaningful?  Cultural Sociology and theories of social structure", Humboldt J. of Social Relations, 22 (2) 
1996: 31-45 at 41; See also P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, translated by R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
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Founded on opposite errors, neither approach is satisfactory.  Form is neither everything 
nor nothing.  Structures and cultures influence each other through innumerable feed-back 
mechanisms:  "Structures shape people's practices, but it is also people's practices that constitute 
(and reproduce) structures....  human agency and structure, far from being opposed, in fact 
presuppose each other."10  Certainly, structures frequently demonstrate an impressive durability 
by contrast with the ephemeral, seemingly fleeting, realm of "culture".  This indeed is precisely 
why revolutionaries or legislators labour mightily to demolish, transform, or create structures:  
they hope to give permanence to their visions.   
Structural transformation unaccompanied by cultural revolution is however doomed to 
failure.  Noting the complexity of all this, we should seek to transcend habits of thought and 
speech which treat structure and culture as distinct spheres, preferring instead to recognise that 
such language crudely parses a hugely complex web.  Our limited descriptive vocabularies should 
not be permitted to legislate our perceptions: structures are, as Giddens reminds us, "both the 
medium and the outcome of the practices which constitute social systems".11  The language 
seems inescapable and, modestly understood, the fictions of structure and culture provide 
convenient entry into a rather complexly integrated whole.  Bearing all this in mind, two further 
models of the relationship are helpful in approaching the history of legal professions.  
Models which foreground cultural efficacy, emphasize that structures themselves are 
cultural artifacts.  Whether deliberately created in fulfillment of a self-conscious plan or emerging 
from ad hoc or contingent processes, professional forms are human creations, constructs made 
and remade from generation to generation.  In many circumstances a time "lag" between cultural 
change and the transformation of structures can be expected, but the relationship is always 
mutually constitutive, the forces never unidirectional.  On occasion, structural projects can take 
concrete form with dramatic speed.  The argument for cultural efficacy is especially strong in 
                                                           
10
  Sewell, Op. Cit., at 4. 
11
  Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Vol. 1: Power, Property and the State (London: Macmillan, 1981), 
27 as quoted in Sewell, ibid. 
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understanding the history of legal professionalism in newly colonized places or in the wake of 
revolution.12  Just as rock forms can be made, transformed and shaped either slowly and subtly 
(over "geological time") or rapidly by catastrophic event, so too social transformations take place 
on many different time-scales.  Discontinuities are possible. 
The second social process is less catastrophic.  In human affairs "social institutions may 
change their substance, though not necessarily their form, in unplanned response to events", 
producing a metasomatism of sorts.13  Incremental change "at the level of culture" can transform 
or even reverse the meanings, functions and effects of enduring structures.  Such change occurred 
in England's legal profession during the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when a 
series of molecular-level transformations turned the English Inns of Court from loosely structured 
gentlemen's guilds into modern, efficient (more or less), "professional" regulatory bodies.  The 
transformation was real and substantial even though surface forms proved remarkably resilient.  
The Bar remained organized around four separate "Inns of Court" in London and circuit "Messes" 
outside of the capital.  Customs of dining and debate persisted, boundary lines between solicitors 
and barristers remained important, and governance continued to be the prerogative of unelected 
"benchers".  All this survived a period of massive political, economic and social dislocation 
relatively unscathed.  Despite apparent stasis in structure both meaning and effect were culturally 
and dynamically constructed.14 
                                                           
12
  In studies of the history of the legal profession, scholars who emphasize the economic monopoly of professions tend to appreciate that many 
professional structures are of relatively recent vintage or, alternatively, that inherited structures have been transformed to new use during the 
nineteenth or early twentieth century.  Surprisingly, however, most such studies fail to recognize the "cultural" rather than merely "economic" 
significance of such transformations.  The same, to lesser degree, might be said of even the "power" theorists of professionalism.  See, for 
example,  Richard L. Abel, "The Rise of Professionalism" (1979) 6 British Journal of Law and Society 82; Richard L. Abel, The Legal 
Profession in England and Wales (Oxford: B.H. Blackwell, 1988); Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989) (monopoly theory); Terence J. Johnson, Professions and Power (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1972) ("power" theory), W. Pue, 
"Trajectories of Professionalism: Legal Professionalism after Abel" in Alvin Esau, ed., Manitoba Law Annual, 1989-1990 (Winnipeg: Legal 
Research Institute, 1991), 57-92 [reprinted from (1990) 19 Manitoba Law Journal, 384-418). 
13
  James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1950) at 273.  The geomorphological 
process of metasomatism is one in which essential transformation is achieved by the migration of elements in and out of an apparently 
unchanging structure.  Though Hurst does not use the term the analogy is apt.  
14
  These transformations are sketched in W. Pue, "Moral Panic at the English Bar:  Paternal vs. Commercial Ideologies of Legal Practice in the 
1860's" (1990) 15 Law and Social Inquiry, 49-118; "Rebels at the Bar: English Barristers and the County Courts in the 1850's" (1987) 16 Anglo-
American Law Review, 303-352; "Exorcising Professional Demons:  Charles Rann Kennedy and the Transition to the Modern Bar" (Spring, 
1987) 5 Law and History Review, 135-174; "Lawyers & Political Liberalism in 18th & 19th Century England", in Lucien Karpik and Terrence 
Halliday, eds., Lawyers and the Rise of Western Political Liberalism: Legal Professions and the Constitution of Modern Politics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 239-302; "Trajectories of Professionalism", op. cit..   
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In the twentieth century history of Canadian legal professions both processes have been at 
play.  A cultural revolution of sorts transformed the structures of legal professionalism between 
1867 and the Second World War.  The lawyers who led these efforts imagined that, by getting the 
structures of legal professionalism "just right", they would transform the country as a whole.  
Once their goals of structural transformation were attained however the larger cultural project fell 
into disfavor.  Less perceptible, lacking dramatic moment, subsequent changes were real 
nonetheless.   
This paper identifies changes in the first third of the twentieth century, illustrating how 
professional forms emerged from the cultural predispositions of reforming lawyers.  Though 
subsequent metasomic processes cannot be explored here, they need to be noted so as to avoid 
leaving a misleading impression of the effects of the transformations described in this essay.  
Often operating in directions opposite to those intended by the cultural revolutionaries of the 
earlier decades, a narrow and constrained technocratic pragmatism supplanted the essentially 
moral vision of modern professionalism's founding fathers. 
 
Dominion and Empire 
Before considering professional transformations in detail it is useful to pause briefly to 
consider the social contexts from which they emerged.  The bursts of Canadian professional 
reform between 1910 and 1939 occurred in the best of times, the worst of times.   
For a brief period Canadians fantasized that the world was theirs to lead and believed in 
turn that Canada's future lay in the west: "Calculations of prairie greatness and celebrations of 
imperial power inevitably ran together; the west would have a population of 100 million; it would 
be the bread-basket of the world; it would become the centre of gravity for all Canada; and, if it 
ruled Canada, and Canada led the empire (as it soon would), then, as anyone could see, the west 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
The contemporaneous transformation of the Paris Ordre des Avocats from association into "corps" is analagous: David A. Bell, Lawyers and 
Citizens: The Making of a Political Elite in Old Regime France (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1994), 52.  cf. Lucien Karpik, French Lawyers: 
A Study in Collective Action, 1274-1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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would lead the world."15  Not surprisingly, many reform initiatives originated in the Canadian 
west and especially in the prairie provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta).  This now 
forgotten periphery was once an important place, simultaneously the object and the soul of 
Canadian imperialism.  Conditions were ripe for social experimentation. 
Numerically small and finding themselves in a "new" land, prairie legal professions 
lacked the inherited social capital enjoyed by lawyers in Ontario and the east.  They faced special 
difficulties in attempting either to assert cultural leadership or to establish its condition precedent, 
a secure market niche.  The political communities of the prairies were hostile to privilege, infused 
with an egalitarian and reform ethos.  Even the structures of Government itself could not be taken 
for granted.  The mood was riotously democratic, consistent both in its rejection of hierarchy, and 
in its questioning of the authoritative voice.  At the same time, extraordinarily rapid social change 
was under way.  Outside forces perpetually destabilized the region economically, socially, and 
politically.  The effects of a newly industrializing continent's "distended society"16 were 
powerfully felt.  Successive waves of populist politics threatened status, wealth, privilege, 
hierarchy, order. 
The region participated in a reforming culture shared with other parts of Anglo-Canada,17 
but it was less inhibited by the constraint of convention or the gravitational pull of congealed 
hierarchies.  In Canada's "new" lands relatively greater emphasis was placed on freedom and its 
prerequisite, the governance of the good and the deserving (rather than to mere submission to 
hierarchy).  Amongst the Anglo-elite, frontier egalitarianism combined creatively with pride in 
"Britishness", and a belief in pioneer virtue.  They held out the hope that this new land "could re-
create the individual just as it improved upon the social order."18  A "militant view of British 
                                                           
15
 Friesen, ibid., 342-343. 
16
   Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York, Hill and Wang, 1967), p. 39. 
17
  Marianna Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 
1991); Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914 (University of Toronto Press, 1970); Ramsay 
Cook, The Regenerators: Social Criticism in Late Victorian English Canada (University of Toronto Press, 1985). 
18
  Gerald Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 303-304, discussing the novels of Ralph 
Connor. 
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civilization" emerged and "the goal of prairie social leaders - a Protestant, law-respecting, 
English-speaking community in which democracy and social equality were fundamental 
assumptions - seemed within reach."19  Proud of their Britishness, western leaders were 
nonetheless "not complacent about British social achievements" and they insisted on their 
"freedom to improve upon the parent culture."20 
Yet, the first three decades of the twentieth century brought unusual challenges.  The 
newness and social fluidity which promised so much also appeared in threatening guise.  The 
Dominion seemed to totter on a knife-edge between heaven on earth and a hell of human making.  
Massive urbanization, industrialization, recession, war, and growing xenophobia all took their 
toll.  Economic dislocations corroded confidence in the future of governance.    Class, ethnic, and 
rural-urban divisions were accentuated, culminating in a post-War burst of radicalism more 
pervasive than any other in North America.  Winnipeg's crippling General Strike of 1919 was 
stunningly effective.21  Anglo-élites experienced a rapid, discomforting, erosion of confidence in 
their ability to assimilate newly "dangerous" others into proper British ways.  Buffeted by 
temperance, women's suffrage, social gospel, labour radicalism, progressivism, the farmer's and 
co-operative movements, socialism and maternal feminism, regional consciousness threatened to 
disintegrate under the pull of centrifugal forces. 
Knowing that lasting social peace could not grow from the barrel of a gun, elites faced the 
conundrum of how best to contain radical urges in a society where deeply-held commitment to an 
open, democratic, egalitarian social order co-existed with quite contrary cultural currents and with 
                                                           
19
  Friesen, 342-343. 
20
    Friesen, ibid., 342-343.   
21
    Frieson, 358, 361. check page refs. The strike, which seemed to substitute government by "strike committee" for the ordinary organs of 
municipal government from May 15 to June 21, 1919, registered powerfully on elite consciousness.  The establishment of a "proletarian 
dictatorship" was explicitly threatened.   
For a useful review of existing historiography and of previously unexplored archival records relating to the Winnipeg General Strike see: Ken 
Kehler and Alvin Esau, Famous Manitoba Trials: The Winnipeg General Strike Trials - Research Resource (University of Manitoba, Legal 
Research Institute, 1990); Craig Heron, ed., The Workers' Revolt in Canada, 1917-1925 (Toronto: U.  Toronto Press, 1998); Tom Mitchell, "To 
Reach the Leadership of This Revolutionary Movment": A. J. Andrews, the Canadian State and the Suppression of the Winnipeg General Strike" 
Prairie Forum, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993, 239-255; Tom Mitchell, "Repressive Measures": A. J. Andrews, the Committee of 1000 and the 
Campaign Against Revolution After the Winnipeg General Strike" left history 3.2 & 4.1, Fall 1995-Spring 1996, 132-167. 
The USA experienced similar concerns which also motivated its "Bar Association Movement".  See: James C. Foster, The Ideology of Apolitical 
Politics: Elite Lawyers' Response to the Legitimation Crisis of American Capitalism, 1870-1920 (NY: Garland, 1990), 97 ff. 
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immense class and ethnic inequities.  Lawyers kept all options under review as they contemplated 
their professional and civic futures.  A degree of professional cohesion was attained through 
multiple professional and social connections, including those formed through the work of the 
Canadian Bar Association.  Regional, Dominion-wide, and international webs of professional 
interconnection provided ideas, promoted consensus, and provided legitimation for novel 
professional projects. 
Looking southward they discovered a social vision which held forth the promise of 
founding a better world on terrain mid-way between the Bolshevik abyss and a sort of ancien 
regime repression on the other.  The middle ground was professionalism.   
 
Remaking Canadian Legal Professionalism 
During the first half of the twentieth century Canada was divided into nine provinces 
(Newfoundland not yet having joined the Dominion) and extensive, sparsely populated, northern 
territories which were administered as colonies of the Dominion government.  Quebec was - and 
remains - distinct from all the others, a civil law jurisdiction living in complex relationships to 
common law Canada.  Its legal professions, cultures, and history are distinctive.  Respecting that 
difference I make no attempt to fold Quebec into the larger Canadian whole.  This essay focuses 
on legal professions in the "rest of Canada".   
Each of the eight common law provinces had its own structures of professional regulation, 
typically featuring a provincial "law society" or equivalent body established under provincial 
legislation.22  All solicitors and barristers were required to be members of the law society of their 
province.  Although Canadian federalism precludes any possibility of a pan-provincial regulatory 
body, reform-minded lawyers of the early twentieth century developed a national voluntary 
association through which to promote their professional visions.  The "Canadian Bar Association" 
(CBA), which emerged as an important force in 1914, was the creature of lawyers who had 
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  A consequence of the division of powers under the Canadian constitution.   
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become frustrated in varying degree by the inaction of provincial law societies (the formal 
regulatory bodies).  Formed quite deliberately within the realm of culture, part of its purpose was 
to spur those bodies into action.  It was backed up or egged on by an array of local "bar 
associations", law student organizations, and similar voluntary bodies, organized with varying 
degrees of formality, ambition, and effectiveness.23  Although Canada was a self-governing 
colony or "British Dominion", it did not follow the English model of a "divided profession".  In 
each of the common law provinces barristers and solicitors, though formally distinct, were 
members of a single professional body.  Most lawyers were both "barrister and solicitor" (a usage 
which continues to the present) and, although some elite lawyers earnestly wished to create a 
distinctive and elite barristers' profession,24 this never came about. 
The Canadian Bar Association (confusingly, never restricted to barristers) provided a 
focal point for new initiatives.  Its influence was felt across Canada and the patterns of 
professionalism which emerged were strongly shaped by it.  Canadian professional reformers 
spearheaded a fundamental re-shaping of their common law structures of legal professionalism.  
Significant reforms were implemented with regard to qualification, education and admission, 
professional ethics, the regulatory powers of professional organizations, and the assertion of a 
lawyers' monopoly over "legal" services.  
Taken together they radically reworked existing structures of professionalism to the point 
where something new and distinctive had emerged. 
 
                                                           
23
  The Vancouver Law Students Association was a particularly important locus of professionalizing activity.  It and the Vancouver Bar 
Association played key roles in the development of British Columbia legal education.  See Pue, Law School: the Story of Legal Education in 
British Columbia (Vancouver: Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, 1995).  For writings on other  similar bodies see: William C. V. 
Johnson, ed., The First Century: Essays on the History of the County of Carleton Law Association by Various Hands on the Occasion of the 
Association's Centenary, 1888-1988 (Bonanza Press, 1988); Robert Crawford, "The New Westminster Bar Association, 1894-1994" (1994) The 
Advocate 221-226.  The story of the Calgary Bar Association is to be found in its own minutes, housed with the Glenbow Archive in Calgary and 
in 23 Volumes of transcripts of oral history inverviews pertaining to the legal history of southern Alberta ca. 1900-1982.  Professionalizing 
movements in Manitoba, Ontario, and British Columbia are discussed respectively in D. Gibson and L. Gibson, Substantial Justice: Law and 
Lawyers in Manitoba, 1670-1970 (Winnipeg: Peguis, 1972), Christopher Moore, The Law Society of Upper Canada and Ontario's Lawyers, 
1797-1997 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), and Alfred Watts, History of the Legal Profession in British Columbia, 1869-1984 
(Vancouver: Law Society of British Columbia, 1984) 
24
  This was, for example, briefly considered within the Law Society of Manitoba during the 1920's.  A short period of formal division was ended 
in Ontario in 1854:  Christopher Moore, "Law Society of Upper Canada", op. cit., 109. 
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Qualification, Education and Admission 
The training, education, and socialization of aspiring lawyers was central to the reform 
agenda.  During the early twentieth century Canadian lawyers moved decisively away from their 
English inheritance.  In the place of almost exclusive reliance upon apprenticeship they created 
ambitious blueprints for a new sort of legal education.  The new model was explicitly cultural in 
content, university focussed, rigorous, and taught in novel ways.  New law schools emerged in 
Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Calgary, Edmonton, Victoria, and Vancouver (later consolidated in 
Winnipeg, Saskatoon, Edmonton, and Vancouver).  Most were affiliated with the Provincial 
university.  Moreover, there were significant developments in curriculum, staffing and 
programme delivery at the older law schools in Fredericton, Halifax, Montreal (where McGill 
uncomfortably straddled the common law and civil law worlds), and Toronto.  Early twentieth 
century reformers sought to raise the pre-law educational requirements so that only University 
graduates would be admitted to legal education (a goal attained only in late century). 
The founders of twentieth century Canadian legal education sought nothing less than to 
impose a uniform "cultural curriculum".  Their objective involved more than merely producing 
better legal technicians.  By restricting entry to the right persons and subjecting them to the right 
sort of legal education, they sought to achieve an enduring transformation of the law students' 
inner essence.  They expected a new class of graduate lawyer to emerge: lawyers who were 
technically competent but also better people, permanently converted to a deep inner 
understanding of the virtues of British law.  Inculcating the wisdom, judgment, and the ethics of 
gentlemen was the central goal.  It was hoped that an army of gentlemen lawyers would emerge, 
to be dispersed over Canada's enormous and varied territory, carrying the life-blood of British 
civilization within them.  Lawyers were to become missionaries in service of a secularized triune: 
law, Britishness, civilization.25 
                                                           
25
  see: W. Pue, "British Masculinities, Canadian Lawyers: Canadian legal education, 1900-1930", in Misplaced Traditions: The Legal 
Profession and the British Empire, Symposium Issue, 16(1) Law in Context, 1999, guest edited by Robert McQueen and W. Wesley Pue, 80-122, 
and sources cited therein. 
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Law Societies 
Reformers also sought to mutate existing provincial law societies bodies into active agents 
of a new professionalism.  They wished to do so in part to achieve particular instrumental goals.  
Symbolism was equally important however.  Law Societies which played an active role in the 
project of professionalism would enjoy enhanced prestige and enlarge the dignity of the 
profession as a whole.  Lying below the field of vision of most late twentieth century observers, 
such symbolic objectives were viewed as considerable and distinct "goods" in and of themselves.  
The dignity of the profession and the prestige of its collective leadership were no small matters in 
an era when notions of honour, dignity and gentlemanliness still carried considerable social 
freight.   
In this respect the reform of law societies was nestled within a larger vision of social 
ordering.  Reformers wished to implant in Canadian soil forms of social governance which were 
neither narrowly economic nor exclusively "political".  Law societies, like Bar Associations, 
gentlemen's clubs, and volunteer associations of all sorts were thought to occupy an important 
space in civil society.  They were to secure their niche in a realm which was neither fully "public" 
nor fully private", acting for the good of public and state alike - but distinctly not as "State" 
agents.  A particular understanding of constitutional governance informed professional reform.26 
This repositioning was most apparent with regard to revamped law society roles 
respecting ethics policing, admissions and qualification, discipline, and monopoly protection. 
 
Law Society Roles I: Ethics Policing 
A radical re-making of approaches to policing the "ethics" of practicing lawyers took 
place, the most tangible marker being the development of an ethics code.  Undertaken at the 
                                                           
26
  The connections between professional organization and constitutional structures of governance in society at large are sketched out in Lucien 
Karpik and Terence Halliday, "Politics Matter" in Halliday and Karpik, eds., Lawyers and the Rise of Western Political Liberalism, Op. Cit., 15-
64. 
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initiative of the Canadian Bar Association this appears in retrospect to have been a logical, 
perhaps a necessary, development of modest proportions.  In fact however the move was highly 
controversial at the time.  It marked a striking deviation from British models of lawyers 
professionalism.27 
The Canadian Bar Association's cultural authority was powerfully felt and most provincial 
law societies soon embraced the notion that a formal promulgation of professional ethical 
standards was desirable.  They in their turn sought changes in their statutory powers so as to 
expand their disciplinary reach into new territory.  The content of Canada's first code of lawyerly 
ethics has provoked insightful scholarly commentary focussed on its coverage, gaps, 
omissions,28 but for present purposes it is the novelty of this form of "ethical" regulation rather 
than its particulars which most bears noting. 
 
Law Society Roles II: Admission & Education 
In and of themselves, the development of more formalized legal education for some 
aspiring lawyers (mandatory formal education for all aspiring lawyers came much later) and the 
promulgation of hortatory ethical codes operate "only" in the realm of culture.  The matter was 
not left there however.  Further innovations gave force to the cultural aspirations of elite lawyers.   
One area related to the "gatekeeping" function of law societies.  Issues surrounding the 
eligibility of women for admission to the legal professions of Canada came to a head in some 
jurisdictions.  There were also statutory changes relating to the enrollment of "foreign", 
aboriginal, or foreign qualified lawyers.  Both types of initiative clearly involved responses to 
centrally important questions regarding just what sort of person from what sort of background 
                                                           
27
  An earlier attempt to create a code had been turned back in Ontario and the CBA initiative was strongly resisted by prominent Ontario judge 
William Renwick Riddell on a number of grounds involving professional tradition and principle.  See Pue, "Becoming `Ethical': Lawyers' 
Professional Ethics in Early Twentieth Century Canada" (1991) 20 Manitoba Law Journal, 227-261 [also published in Dale Gibson & W. 
Wesley Pue, eds., Glimpses of Canadian Legal History (Legal Research Institute, University of Manitoba, Fall 1991), 237-277.] 
28
  J.W. Hamilton, "Metaphors of Lawyers' Professionalism" (1995), 33 Alta. L. Rev. 833-58.  
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could properly embody law in a new British Dominion, a question not yet adequately explored in 
Canadian historical writing.29 
Other changes expanded the ambit of discretion exercisable by the governing boards of 
law societies ("Benchers") in making decisions about admissions and qualifications.  In some 
cases statutory redefinitions of law society powers were passed (sometimes retroactively) in order 
to facilitate the creation of full-time professional law faculties.30 
Such changes were important both in themselves and for their symbolic impact.  The 
honour of the legal profession and hence its cultural authority was thought to be much bound up 
with its discretionary authority:  the wider the discretion, the greater the honour and, hence, the 
greater the cultural capital of the profession.  A high point in this movement (in one way of 
seeing things) was the judgment of Hunter C.J. in Re Hagel holding that there "is no right of 
admission" to the Law Society.  Mr. Justice Hunter explained that  
the discretion to call or to admit ought to be left exclusively to the Benchers... it 
would not be in the public interest to permit any right of review.  It must be evident 
that a judge is not in as good a position to pass on a matter of this kind as the 
                                                           
29
  See however Mary Kinnear, In Subordination: Professional Women, 1870-1970 (McGill-Queen's UP, 1995); Joan Brockman,  "Not By 
Favour But By Right': The History of Women and Visible Minorities in the Legal Profession of British Columbia", in John McLaren and Hamar 
Foster, eds., Essays in the History  of Canadian Law, Volume 6: The Legal History of British Columbia and the Yukon (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press and The Osgoode Society, 1995), 508-561; Carol A. Aylward, Canadian Critical Race Theory: Racism and the Law (Halifax: 
Fernwood Publishing, 1999), 44-45;  Lois K. Yorke, "Mabel Penery French (1881-1955): A Life Re-Created" (1993) 42 University of New 
Brunswick Law Journal 3; Constance Backhouse, Petticoats & Prejudice: Women and Law in Nineteenth Century Canada (Toronto: Women's 
Press, 1991); Constance Backhouse, "To Open the Way for Others of My Sex:  Clara Brett Martin's Career as Canada's First Woman lawyer", 
(1985) 1 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, 1-41; Pue, Law School, op. cit.; Peter M. Sibenik, "Doorkeepers: Legal Education in the 
Territories and Alberta, 1885-1928" (1990) Dal. L. J., 419-464; Alfred Watts, History of the Legal Profession in British Columbia, op. cit.; 
Dawna Tong `A History of Exclusion: The Treatment of Racial and Ethnic Minorities by the Law Society of British Columbia in Admissions to 
the Legal Profession' The Advocate 56:2 (March 1998) 197-208; Pue, "British Masculinities", op. cit.  Margaret Thornton's, Dissonance and 
Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1996) is, in part, an outstanding study of the embodiment of law 
in lawyers.  The book is discussed by Ramshaw and Pue in "Feminism Unqualified: (review essay) (1997) 15:1 Law in Context, 166-178. 
Statutory changes included:  Sask. 1912-13 (Amendment to Sec. 37 by adding new section 37a, allowing benchers in their discretion to make 
rules providing for the admission of women to practice as barristers and solicitors); Man. 1912, An Act to amend "The Law Society Act" 
(interpretation section, Section 2 amended adding that persons includes females within the Act); eg., 1907 The Legal Profession Act; Alta. 1911-
12, c4, s29 (2) (modest changes to provisions for enrollment of British, colonial or foreign legal practitioners; s29 (3) (change to the oath sworn 
and provisions for custody of roll of society); The Legal Profession Act; Alta. 1911-12, c4, 29 (2) (change in provisions for enrollment of British, 
colonial or foreign legal practitioners); s29 (3) (change to the oath sworn and provisions for custody of roll of society).   
30
  egs., Man. 1909 An Act to amend "The Law Society Act", Section 54 (d) (the admittance of attorneys not practicing in the province redered 
subject to rules framed by the Benchers); Man. 1911, An Act to amend "The Law Society Act" (increasing discretion of Benchers regarding the 
admission of members and students-at-law in special cases); Man. 1915, An Act to amend "The Law Society Act", S. 40 (powers of Benchers to 
make rules for improvement of legal education amended by specifically including the establishment and maintenance of a Law School, permitting 
regulations respecting attendance at classes or instructions at law, and so on); Alta. 1921, An Act to amend the Legal Profession Act, (new 
provision - section 32 in 1922 amendments - 35 providing for the admission of university of Alberta Graduates having completed degree in law 
and served articles); Alta. 1947, An Act to Amend the Legal Profession Act, (adding Section 62a permitting Benchers to make provision for 
enrollment of students from other universities than the University of Alberta under certain conditions). 
Some related developments are discussed in works such as Peter M. Sibenik, "Doorkeepers", op. cit.; Dale Gibson, and Lee Gibson, "Substantial 
Justice", op. cit., Alfred Watts, "Legal Profession in British Columbia", op. cit.; Christopher Moore, "Law Society of Upper Canada", op. cit. 
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Benchers....  There is a latitude and discretion in such a matter inherent in such a 
tribunal as the Benchers which is not available to a Court. 
The ratio decidendi (reasons for decision) of the Hagel case could have been narrowly 
expressed as limited to circumstances in which a fully qualified lawyer who just happens to have 
been imprisoned for three years for aiding a jail break by smuggling a gun and rope into one of 
his clients subsequently seeks admission to the legal profession in another province after his 
release from prison31.  Chief Justice Hunter however sought to establish the broadest possible 
scope of cultural authority for the benchers.  In so doing he imagined himself to be according the 
colonial law society a gentlemanly status and a role equivalent to that of England's ancient Inns of 
Court.32  Similar cultural presuppositions also underlay the British Columbia courts' decisions in 
the late 1940's upholding the Law Society's rejection of a communist who, political conviction 
apart, was fully qualified.  The patterns of decision-making in Martin v. Law Society of B.C. have 
conventionally been understood as manifesting a sort of hysteria-driven conspiracy of the legal 
elite.  That interpretive frame, rendered plausible by the subsequent McCarthyite purges in the 
USA and by the fact that the judges undoubtably shared the Benchers' opinion that communism 
was a `pernicious creed', obscures other aspects of the case.  The Benchers' genuine commitment 
to an ideal of lawyering as a gentlemanly service and to visions of professional governance which 
were thought to advance this were shared with the judiciary.  The assertion that "it is not for the 
Court to substitute its view for that of the Benchers" (expressed by Coady J. at the Supreme Court 
of British Columbia, and endorsed by the Court of Appeal) simultaneously reflects a 
constitutional commitment of sorts within "administrative law" and an understanding of the roles 
of Canadian legal professions which would have been unintelligible before the reforms 
spearheaded by the early Canadian Bar Association.33 
 
                                                           
31
 See Dale and Lee Gibson, “Substantial Justice”, op. cit., 211. 
32
  Re Hagel, per Hunter C.J., 31 B.C. R., 75-77, at 77. 
33
  Re Legal Professions Act, Re Martin, Reasons of the Benchers for the Refusal of the Application, 30 October, 1948 [1949] 1 D.L.R. 105-
114; Re Legal Professions Act, Re Martin, [1949] 2 D.L.R., 559-567 (B.C.S.C., Coady J.); Martin v. Law Society of British Columbia [1950] 3 
D.L.R. 173-199. 
Pue, Lawyers & Vampires: Structures & Cultures,  p. 17 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
Law Society Roles III: Discipline 
The historical antecedents of the contemporary legal professions' disciplinary powers over 
its members is easily misunderstood.  Most post-World War II observers tend to assume that such 
powers are somehow inherent in the idea of legal professionalism (they are not).  Hence it is 
commonly assumed that such bodies have always (or practically always) had full, unfettered, 
discretion to discipline lawyers by means of censure, suspension or expulsion.  It also seems 
logical, from our vantage point, to assume that the power to expel a member necessarily has the 
consequence that that person is thereafter prohibited from earning a living from the practice of 
law.  We take for granted the effective policing of a monopoly on legal services.34  Such 
assumptions, each of them false, are frequently reflected in hurriedly-produced professional 
apologetics but also underlie some of the more reflective writing on professional history.35 
At least three further factors contribute to confusion.  First, the waters are muddied by a 
rather unreflective North American elision of the histories of the barristers' and solicitors' 
professions.36  Secondly, confusion arises when the historic roles of courts and of lawyers' 
organizations are misunderstood.  The inherent right of superior courts to limit who can appear 
before them and how those people (whether solicitors/attorneys or advocates) may conduct 
themselves has long been recognized.  It should never be mistaken for the exercise of disciplinary 
powers by an organized professional body.  These are quite distinct matters.37  Finally, and most 
confusingly, the organized legal professions' long-standing exercise of power to expel convicted 
criminals is all too easily mistaken for a plenary disciplinary power.  Though the former is of 
                                                           
34
  Note however the recent case of Maurice Sychuk, disbarred by the Law Society of Alberta for murdering his wife, and denied reinstatement at 
the conclusion of his sentence.  (The Law Society of Alberta, "Reasons for the Benchers' decision re. Maurice Sychuk's Application for 
Reinstatement as a member of the Law Society of Alberta"  October, 1999).  The press reported that Mr. Sychuk nonetheless earned a living from 
working in Calgary in the field of "oil and gas", an area within his established legal expertise.  cf. F. Edge, The Iron Rose - The Extraordinary 
Life of Charlotte Ross, M.D. (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press 1992), providing an account of a woman physician who was able to 
practice medicine despite being refused recognition by formal regulatory bodies. 
35
  One among many misperceptions of the histories of legal professions found in professional apologetics.  see Pue, "Better Myth", op. cit. 
36
  see Pue, "Better Myth", op. cit. 
37
   This aspect, which raises a question of professional discipline in the context of a constitutional separation-of-powers is ably dealt with in 
James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1950) at 278-79.  The relationship between 
courts and professional bodies in the USA is complex and leads to some confusion between these quite different exercises of power.  These 
matters are ably dealt with in William H. Hurlburt, The Self-Regulation of the Legal Profession in Canada and in England and Wales (Calgary 
& Edmonton: Law Society of Alberta and Alberta Law Reform Institute, 2000). 
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relatively ancient vintage within the Anglo-Canadian tradition, the latter has only been asserted in 
relatively recent times.38 
Curiously, the writings of Mr. Justice William Renwick Riddell have added to the 
confusion.  A prominent figure in the early twentieth century legal profession, Riddell was both a 
Canadian legal historian and a student of legal professionalism.39  His conclusion that Ontario's 
Law Society (the "Law Society of Upper Canada") had enjoyed full disciplinary powers over 
members of the Bar, attorneys, solicitors, and articled clerks since 1876 (or 1881)40 is easily 
misconstrued as having more expansive meaning than intended.  It stands in apparent self-
contradiction to his forceful argument against the adoption of codes of professional "ethics" by 
Canadian law societies. On that matter he argued vigorously that "[i]f it were proposed to make 
the Code a Penal Code violation of which would render the offender liable to disbarment, 
legislation would be necessary, and many considerations would arise ....  which to my mind 
would be fatal to the proposition."41  
The apparently glaring inconsistency is easily resolved when it is recalled that when one 
wrote in 1926 of a law society having "full disciplinary powers", this in no way implied a plenary 
and exclusive jurisdiction over lawyers' conduct of the sort we now take for granted.  Though the 
idea that law societies should be entirely sufficient and efficient in the control of their members' 
conduct was "in the air" in the early twentieth century, no such plans had yet come to fruition.  
Existing powers were constrained by quasi-constitutional understandings regarding the autonomy 
                                                           
38
  Robert Baldwin's fascinating report on the Law Society of Upper Canada's disciplinary powers, prepared in relation to the case of James 
Doyle, who had been removed from the Court of King's Bench list of attorneys for misconduct, merits further scrutiny.  See Christopher Moore, 
op. cit., 70.  Note however that in this case the primacy of the courts as the locus of discipline is taken entirely for granted. 
39
  see Law Society of Upper Canada Archives, The Riddell Collection in the Great Library at Osgoode Hall, Text from an Exhibition prepared 
by the Law Society of Upper Canada with financial support from the Law Foundation of Ontario (LSUC, 1992) 
40
   William Renwick Riddell, The Bar and Courts of the Province of Upper Canada or Ontario (Toronto: MacMillan, 1928), 111-112.  The 
legislative changes which Riddell addresses are ably explained in Curtis ColeCurtis Cole, "`A Learned and Honorable Body': The 
Professionalization of the Ontario Bar, 1867-1929 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1987), Chapter 5, "`To Purge the 
profession of those who bring disgrace upon their Brethern': The Bar's Assumption of Autonomous Professional Self-Discipline." 
See also Christopher Moore, "Law Society of Upper Canada", op. cit., 149: "Discipline in the legal profession was also transformed.  Though 
barristers had been disbarred for ungentlemanly behaviour as early as 1820, only in 1876 had the society's disciplinary power been made explicit 
in the Law Society Act, and judges had continued to assert a right to discipline the solicitors enrolled by their courts." 
41
  William Renwick Riddell, "A Code of Legal Ethics," (1919) 4 Reports of the Can. Bar Assn., 136-149, at 139. 
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of individual lawyers, by the jealousy of the courts in preserving their traditional authority over 
the legal profession, and by the terms of legislation in various provinces. 
The idea that the organized legal professions should be the sole locus of disciplinary 
power over lawyers was in fact boldly innovative.  So too the related notion that powers of 
discipline and punishment should be enforced in a field as nebulous as professional "ethics".42  
The hidden hand of the Canadian Bar Association was felt as a series of statutory changes 
transformed Canadian legal professions.  The direction of movement was from rather loose 
gentlemanly guilds into something closer to the modern disciplinary apparatus we now take for 
granted.  These changes gave clearer definition to Law Society powers over discipline, 
regularized or streamlined procedures, increased the ambit of that authority, and - over time - 
moved the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts further and further into the background.  But 
none of this was part of any ancient English heritage.  It was only in the first half of the century 
that law societies were actively transformed into organizations with public regulatory roles which 
far surpassed those of earlier guild structures.43 
Importantly, as their powers increased, so too did their "dignity".  This mattered 
immensely to a generation less obsessed than our own with the efficacy of power and less 
exclusively focussed on narrowly, pragmatically conceived instrumentalism.   
                                                           
42
  Riddell's objections were cogent.  See Pue, "Becoming `Ethical'", op. cit.  Peter M. Sibenik's research has traced out developments in relation 
to professional discipline in Alberta.  See Sibenik, "`The Black Sheep': The Disciplining of Territorial and Alberta Lawyers, 1885-1928" (1988) 3 
Canadian Journal of Law & Society/ Revue Canadienne Droit et Société, 109-139.  
43
  This shift was reflected in a series of legislative changes to the framework of regulation by law societies including: Man. 1915, An Act to 
amend "The Law Society Act"; Sask. 1919-1920, An Act to Amend the Legal Profession Act; Alta. 1921, An Act to amend the Legal Profession 
Act; Sask. 1923, An Act to Amend the Legal Profession Act;  Alta. 1924, An Act to amend the Legal Profession Act; Alta. 1925, An Act to 
amend the Legal Profession Act; Alta. 1926, An Act to amend the Legal Profession Act; Man. 1926 An Act to amend "The Law Society Act"; 
Alta. 1928, An Act to amend the Legal Profession Act; Sask. 1933, An Act to amend The Legal Profession Act; Sask. 1936, An Act to Amend the 
Legal Profession Act; Man. 1943, An Act to amend The Law Society Act.  Generally these provisions extended the powers of the benchers to 
regulate the conduct of lawyers, limiting the authority of the courts in these matters.   
        For accounts of law society disciplinary powers see Alfred Watts, op. cit., Ch. 10, "Discipline", 117-132;  Lee Gibson, "A Brief History of 
the Law Society of Manitoba", in Cameron Harvey, ed., The Law Society of Manitoba, 1877-1977 (Winnipeg: Peguis Publishers Limited, 1977), 
28-51, at 50;  Dale Gibson and Lee Gibson, Substantial Justice: Law and Lawyers in Manitoba 1670-1970 (Winnipeg: Peguis Publishers, 1972),  
128, 171-2, 240, 252, 257, 267, 305;  Christopher Moore, The Law Society of Upper Canada and Ontario's Lawyers, 1797-1997 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1997), 61, 70, 125-6, 149-51, 300-2, 323-4, 326-9; Peter Sibenik, "`The Black Sheep': The Disciplining of 
Territorial and Alberta Lawyers, 1885-1928", (1988) 3 Canadian Journal of Law and Society/ Revue Canadienne de droit et société, 109-139, 
especially, "The Locus of Disciplinary Power", 113-120; Curtis Cole, "`A Learned and Honorable Body': The Professionalization of the Ontario 
Bar, 1867-1929 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1987), Chapter 5, "`To Purge the profession of those who bring 
disgrace upon their Brethern': The Bar's Assumption of Autonomous Professional Self-Discipline" (pointing out that the courts' exercise of 
disciplinary jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Law Society in Ontario continued well into the twentieth century). 
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Law Society Roles IV: Asserting Monopoly 
The final element of early twentieth century transformations in Canadian legal professions 
was the extension of a lawyers' monopoly beyond its traditional domain (rights of audience or 
agency before superior courts) and increased protection within the widening "competition-free" 
zone.  The protected zone expanded consistently during the second and third decade of the 
twentieth century.  Saskatchewan, for example, made it unlawful to act under false pretenses by 
holding oneself "out to be a barrister and solicitor" whether or not the individual did so in 
appearing before the Court of Kings' Bench (1923).  Manitoba extended lawyers' monopoly, first 
prohibiting unqualified individuals from threatening legal procedures or using documents 
simulating court forms (1932) and then protecting lawyers' monopolies over conveyancing 
(1933).  Similar provisions were enacted in Alberta in 1936.  In neighbouring Saskatchewan non-
lawyers were prohibited from threatening legal proceedings on behalf of a creditor (1933).  In that 
province the policing of monopoly by means of annual certification was strengthened in 1936.  
Manitoba again reinforced its unauthorized practice prohibitions in 1943.44 
Beneath the surface of legislative change, law societies invested considerable effort in 
enforcing prohibitions on "unauthorized practice".45  Future research will, in all likelihood, 
reveal that this hidden terrain was where "the action" was. 
 
                                                           
44
  Sask. 1923, An Act to Amend the Legal Profession Act,  s. 37 (1); 1932 An Act to amend The Law Society Act, s. 53; Man. 1933 An Act to 
amend The Law Society Act, s. 53 (The Manitoba Act to amend The Law Society Act, 1937, added s. 53A, specified that the prohibition 
extended to corporations as well as to natural persons.  Fines were imposed on unauthorized individuals preparing instruments for conveyancing 
of real and personal property); Alta. 1936, An Act to Amend the Legal Profession Act, s. 59 amended by adding 59a, imposing penalties for 
preparation of instruments (for reward) in relation to any real or personal estate or incorporation of joint stock proceedings; Sask. 1933, An Act to 
amend The Legal Profession Act. (amending s. 64 of the Legal Profession Act. Sask. 1936, An Act to Amend the Legal Profession Act, enacting  
"No  person except those enrolled as barristers and solicitors of Saskatchewan and holding subsisting annual certificates issued to them pursuant 
to the rules and bylaws of the society shall practise at the bar of any court of civil or criminal jurisdiction in Saskatchewan..." and making it an 
offence for anyone without a subsisting annual certificate to willfully pretend to be qualified to act as a barrister or solicitor; Man. 1943, An Act 
to amend The Law Society Act, ss. 53 and 54 repealed and replaced by a new, wider, s. 53, expressly including the drawing of wills within the 
lawyers' monopoly, prohibiting simulating court procedures, prohibiting employment of disbarred persons.  The new legislation allowed for 
injunctions to be obtained against unauthorized persons. Statutory exceptions to the ambit of unauthorized practice prohibitions protected public 
officers, notaries and persons acting for themselves. 
On similar developments in British Columbia during this time period see Alfred Watts, History of the Legal Profession in British Columbia, 
1869-1984 (Vancouver: Law Society of British Columbia, 1984), 119-120. 
45
  This is revealed in the records of the Manitoba Law Society.  See also Watts, op. cit., 120;  Peter Sibenik, The Doorkeepers: The Governance 
of Territorial and Alberta Lawyers, 1885-1928 (U. of Calgary, M.A. Thesis, 1984), "The Protective Impulse", 170-180). 
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Re-making the Legal Profession: Summary 
All told then, the contours of professionalism shifted significantly, even if we restrict our 
gaze to the most formal level.  Less visible transformations were advanced by means of the 
delegated rule-making authority and less formal policies of law societies and, in part, through the 
creative interaction of all aspects of lawyering with wider social, cultural, and intellectual 
contexts.46 
The more important questions, perhaps, are why these changes?  Why in this place?  Why 
at this time?  We are taken part way to an answer by noting that this professional renewal was 
carefully planned in advance.  Structural innovation, even in relatively narrow fields takes time, 
labour, energy.  These are not tasks to be under-taken lightly, even where strong leaders find 
developed blue-prints of change readily available for appropriation.  Nor is it "rational" for 
individuals to undertake such projects - at least if rational behaviour is understood in terms of 
narrow self-interest.  The time and energy demands are far in excess of any conceivable benefit 
individuals might derive from successful completion of such tasks.  If we are to appreciate why 
leading lawyers invested so heavily in reforming their profession it is necessary to look outward 
to their beliefs and to their larger social contexts.  The founders of Canada's modern legal 
professions did not undertake these tasks for personal profit nor in order to advance guild interest 
as an end in itself.  They believed that developing a certain kind of lawyers' hegemony was 
essential to the preservation of constitutional monarchy, liberal governance, and Britishness.  It is 
their deep and public-spirited commitment to these ideals which explains their actions.  
Professionalization was part of larger projects aimed at securing a safe future for all they held 
dear.  Their parochial work in transforming their own profession was part of their contributions to 
a much larger cultural revolution.   
                                                           
46
  The full cultural import of legal education, for example, cannot be discerned from statutory histories alone but needs to be understood in 
relation to universities, curriculum, and wider cultural contexts.  See Pue, "British masculinities", op. cit., and sources cited therein. 
Further evidence of the sorts of changes which might be involved at this "hidden" level are documented in P.J. Giffen, (1961) "Social control and 
professional self-government: a study of the legal profession in Canada," in S.D. Clark, Urbanism and the Changing Canadian Society (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 117-134). 
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The context from which these changes emerged is well behind us, the culture of moral 
reform which spawned them invites ridicule.  Nonetheless, their professional structures endure.  
This is so even though subsequent social changes have very nearly inverted the cultural ethos 
which originally gave them meaning.  Subsequent processes have indeed transformed 
professionalism but have done so within inherited frames which sit oddly out of time at the turn 
of a new century. 
 
Canada, An `American' nation 
Canada is an "American" nation47 and despite the then widespread affection for the 
British Empire it is arguable that the dominant cultural influence on Canadian lawyers in this 
period came from the United States of America.  By the early twentieth century a ready-made 
template of professionalization had been developed there, drawing upon conceptions of social 
ordering which resonated with contemporary concerns.  North American social thought conceived 
of professionalism as the only acceptable bulwark capable of protecting ordered society from 
descent into "lawlessness and anarchy."48  Never fully implemented in the United States, a neatly 
packaged ideology of legal professionalism was available there.  It came in a form which 
simultaneously advanced the cause of professional reform and deflected criticism, hostility, and 
"anti-lawyer sentiment."   
On both sides of the border an intensely moral professionalism developed, designed to 
advance the rule of the "righteous" and the rule of law rather than either the government of either 
the masses or of those who were merely knowledgeable.  Lawyers commonly thought of their 
profession in such terms.  British Columbia's Justice O'Halloran, for example, gave voice to such 
a view: 
Moreover, the law student's training is not manual training, but is training of the 
mind, not only in law, but if he wishes to be something more than a mere legal 
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mechanic, he must study logic, history, in particular constitutional history, political 
science and economics, a certain amount of philosophy and acquire a reasonable 
familiarity with English literature, and know something at least of the literature of 
other countries.  The job of a lawyer is basically to advise people upon all manner of 
things arising out of the complexities of life and the frailties of human nature.  As 
such he cannot fail in time to acquire an influence upon others, impossible to reduce 
to purely material terms.  It is not too much to say that the training and experience a 
lawyers undergoes fits him for leadership to a greater or less degree.  Obviously such 
men should not be partial to political philosophies and movements that conflict with 
the interests of their own country.  
By reason of these things, all countries throughout the ages have given the lawyer 
a correspondingly high place in society - particularly so in the case of the lawyer who 
pleads in the higher Courts.  The object of law training is to attract young men of high 
character, and to train them in a manner that they will be trustworthy, honourable and 
competent in the performance of their legal duties, and will use such influence as they 
have to maintain and improve but not destroy our Canadian constitutional democracy.  
They are to be the defenders and not the destroyers of liberty.  They are expected to 
be sufficiently well-informed and experienced to distinguish between liberty and 
licence.49 
It mattered deeply in other words that lawyers be gentlemen, right-thinking, and politically safe.  
Such understandings provided a pervasive common language which gave direction to developing 
legal professionalism and rendered the projects of professional elites palatable - even attractive - 
to a wider public. 
In developing a "moral" vision of professionalism Canadians looked south for inspiration 
rather than "home" to Britain.  They did so for several reasons.  Proximity as well as ease and 
density of social contact account for much.  So too does social fit.  The United States, like 
Canada, had suffered the disruptions associated with immigration, internal colonization, and the 
industrialization of an immense federation.  It also was avowedly democratic, heterogeneous in 
ethnicity, language, and religion, regionally diverse, and heavily marked by a migrating frontier of 
European settlement.  The U.S.A. experienced continuous change and was racked with 
uncertainty, at times overwhelmed by the sense of "the irrationality of life".50  By the turn of the 
century it had become a "distended" society marked by business and political disorganization, a 
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widening "cultural gap between city and countryside", "[i]rresponsibility" and "ethical evasions."  
"Respectable" citizens feared that "the true and simple America [was] in jeopardy from foes of 
extraordinary, raw strength - huge, devouring monopolies, swarms of sexually potent immigrants, 
and the like."51   
Seeking ordered freedom, `science' stepped in to fill the governmental void left by the 
overthrow of traditional sources of authority.52  A novel political and cultural project emerged, a 
`culture of professionalism' in which lay persons were required to trust the integrity and 
omnicompetence of an emergent educated class: "Science as a source for professional authority 
transcended the favoritism of politics, the corruption of personality, and the exclusiveness of 
partisanship."53 
The political corollary of all this was the rise of progressivism in its various mutations, the 
development of the bureaucratic state, "reform", an abandonment of party loyalties, and a search 
for mechanisms whereby authority in discrete areas of social life might be entrusted to "experts" 
for the good of all.54  Reformers of many stripes looked forward hopefully to a world made 
better by rational planning, education, proper procedures, regularity, and the creation of means by 
which to infuse "ethics" into the interstices of everyday life.55  Religion transmuted into "social 
gospel" and the notion that ethical life could be segmented was eroded.  Regulation seemed 
desirable to generations who perceived change as fundamental, inevitable, and rapid. but who had 
not yet forgotten the moral claims of a "public sphere".56   
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In this era lawyers presented themselves as specialists in law but also as guardians of 
cultural knowledges, in effect, "universal experts".57  "Professional" principles held forth the 
promise of containing social discontent and maintaining order.58  One formulation had it that "if 
the down-pull of government by plebiscite is to be arrested, if the vortex movement of democracy 
is to be counter-balanced, it will be accomplished mainly by the grace of the professional 
spirit."59  Curious admixtures of conservatism, reverence for property, social elitism, community 
spiritedness, laissez-faire, "service", and "duty" resulted. 
 
Obvious unsuitability of other models 
Whatever the emotional tugs on colonial heartstrings, it was clear to all that English 
models of legal professionalism could not practicably be sustained in North America. 
The "fit" was difficult enough in Ontario and Atlantic Canada, impossible in Quebec and 
the west.  Key elements of English legal professionalism could not be transplanted.  A strong 
egalitarian ethos combined with the small numbers of lawyers in the west to make a rigid 
demarcation of solicitors from barristers impracticable - in sharp contradistinction to the 
experience of some other British "Dominions" and colonies.60  The legal professions in the 
western provinces were of recent origin, created by statute, and far removed in origin, structure, 
and governance from the English Inns of Court.  Features central to the English barristers' 
profession were palpably absurd in the newest part of the New World at the dawn of "Canada's 
Century".  Governance by a self perpetuating oligarchy, qualification on the basis of meals eaten, 
expected (but largely unenforced) conformity to imprecise principles of "etiquette" and regulation 
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by itinerant dining clubs, to pick only the most obvious examples, could not be transplanted into a 
new place. 
Ontario's Law Society or its' younger cousin, the Law Society of England and Wales, 
provided models more suited to transplantation.  U.S.A. models proved more compelling 
however.  A significant trans-boundary intercourse took place amongst professional leaders.61 
The evolving culture wove six strands of a new professionalism together.  Not 
surprisingly, these bear striking resemblance to innovations actually implemented in common law 
Canada during the early twentieth century.   The new model was founded on a confidence in 
professional meritocracy which in turn was to be constructed from stringent admission standards, 
formal education, examined expertise, and practical experience.  It relied on an ongoing cleansing 
of the bar by means of the enforcement of ethical standards by professional governing bodies 
operating independently of state control.  Minimum fee schedules and the creation of a secure 
monopoly over the right to provide legal services were seen as providing a necessary quid pro quo 
for such constraints on ordinary market principles and, of course, the suppression of all and any 
"unlicensed competitors" was necessary if the new structures were to be effective. 
First taking shape as a coherent, deliberate and workable "project" in the early twentieth 
century U.S.A., this web of professionalism had come to constitute a professional "common 
sense" by the time the Canadian Bar Association began to assert itself.62  The individual 
components, moreover, were understood as constituting a unitary structure, a "whole cloth" of 
inseparable strands.  A compelling logic bound the whole together.  It was thought, for example, 
that individuals would not be willing to pursue an extensive professional education unless certain 
privileges (eg. the dignity attached to self governance) and financial benefits (mandatory fee 
schedules and protected monopoly) could be guaranteed.  This in turn required statutory 
                                                           
61
  Reports of proceedings for both the "American Bar Association" and the "Canadian Bar Association" during the early decades of the Century 
reveal patterns of elite interaction which have yet to be properly assessed.  For one example see Sir James Aikins, "Inaugural Address of the 
President. Sir James Aikins, K.C., Knt., Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba", 54 Can. L. J., 1918, 344-357, 348 (discussing the immense U.S. 
influence on Canada).  cf.  
"'Our Arctic Brethren: Canadian Law and Lawyers as Portrayed in American Legal Periodicals, 1829-1911" in Jim Phillips and G. Blaine Baker, 
eds., Essays in Canadian Law, Vol. VIII: In Honour of Richard Risk (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1999). 241-280.  
62
  This is broadly the agenda set forth by Julius Henry Cohen, op. cit.  See below 
Pue, Lawyers & Vampires: Structures & Cultures,  p. 27 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
prohibition on unlicensed practice and the enforcement of codes of "ethics".  Otherwise, the 
privileges could not be justified, the benefits could not flow.63  Because only practicing lawyers 
could appreciate both the constitutional principles on which legality was based and the concrete 
problems which arose in day to day legal work, their own professional bodies, independent of 
state and lay interference alike, needed to be given charge of ethical and professional matters.64 
Idealized "traditions" of the professional guild (emphasizing service orientation and anti-
commercialism) were melded with the new ideology of regulation, bureaucratic regularity, 
"scientific" credentialling, and ethical policing to produce a distinctly twentieth century, uniquely 
North American, version of professionalism.65  Julius Cohen's remarkable book, The Law: - 
Business or Profession?, for example, is replete with self-conscious references to the ways in 
which a new "evolution of a new public opinion,"66 a "new philosophy which is to be American 
democracy's great gift to the world,"67 mandated professional reforms.  It called for nothing less 
than an entire new formulation of professionalism, emphasizingd "duty", "service rather than 
profit," rigorous educational standards, professional conscience, and enforcement of ethical codes 
so as to "purge" the dishonorable from the profession.68  Of necessity, "unauthorized practice" 
would have to be prohibited and effectively punished.69 
Canada's reform-minded lawyers too articulated a vision of professionalism as an 
immutable whole.  This involved careful attention to defining the limits of acceptable society 
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with an almost obsessive cultural emphasis on structured knowledge, rational education, and the 
virtues of science.70  Finally, they shared the widespread notion that professionalism provided a 
magic key capable of maintaining authority in a society rent by centrifugal forces. 
The most articulate advocate of American-style professionalism in the period was the 
intensely proud British Canadian Lawyer, Sir James Aikins.  Variously a leading lawyer, Royal 
Commissioner, Manitoba Governor-General, and founding President of the Canadian Bar 
Association, Aikins worked hard in the cause of professional reform.  His address on the topic of 
"The Legal Profession in Relation to Ethics, Education and Emolument," delivered at the 
Canadian Bar Association meeting in Winnipeg in August, 1919 makes clear the extent to which 
reforms of legal professionalism were implemented as part of an integrated plan.  Like Cohen, his 
remarks point to the absolute imbrication of the political, economic, cultural and "professional" 
spheres.71   
Asserting that the lawyer's first duty is to the State, Aikins developed arguments against 
open admissions and in favor of both more rigorous educational requirements and more active 
"moral" policing: 
It is a false notion of democracy that the right to practice law should be free for all, 
that anyone can practice it, and without serious loss to the public, operate or help to 
operate the expensive and intricate machinery of justice which the State creates for its 
safety and well-being.  The administration of justice has always touched the nadir of its 
decline when the profession has been lowest in morals and least educated.  In such times 
there is seen a tendency on the part of practitioners to regard the work of the Bar as a 
trade and not a profession, a thing to be bartered and not a national service to be sought 
after;  then also is found the pettifogger, the ambulance chaser, the fabricator of evidence 
and the trickster, and the man who is alien to the professional spirit and its traditions, 
destitute of gentlemanly instincts, disrespectful to his seniors, and a slanderer of 
Judges.72 
                                                           
70
  see Laycock, op. cit.  On Canadian legal education see: Pue, "British Masculinities", op. cit.; "`The disquisitions of learned Judges': Making 
Manitoba Lawyers, 1885-1931", in Jim Phillips and G. Blaine Baker, eds., Essays in the History of Canadian Law: In Honour of R.C.B. Risk 
(Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1999), 825-914; "Common Law Legal Education in Canada's Age of Light, Soap and Water" in Canada's Legal 
Inheritances, Symposium Issue, edited by W. Wesley Pue and D. Guth, (1995) 23 Manitoba Law Journal, 654-688. 
71
  Sir James Aikins,  "The Legal Profession in Relation to Ethics, Education and Emolument" 55 Can. L. J., 1919, 335-338. 
72
  Sir James Aikins,  "The Legal Profession in Relation to Ethics, Education and Emolument" 55 Can. L. J., 1919, 335-338, at 335, emphasis 
added. 
Pue, Lawyers & Vampires: Structures & Cultures,  p. 29 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
In tone and in content this echoes contemporary professional apologetics in the United States of 
America.73  The Queen's Representative was remarkably "American" in his professionalizing 
role. 
One central feature of this new vision was the articulation of a code of professional 
conduct coupled with a new determination on the part of professional governing bodies to 
actively seek out and expunge "undesirable" practitioners.  This was thought necessary for 
professional cohesion, utility and security.  As Aikins said on another occasion, "[i]f the legal 
profession refuses to ruthlessly rid itself of its barnacles and fungus, how can the public be 
expected to extend to the profession, as a profession, the high honor, the dignity and revenue 
which that profession rightly deserves."74   This project of defining the good practitioner turned 
toward explicit class bias or nativism and wartime prohibitions on the admission of members of 
non-charter ethnic groups reflected a deep-seated fear of "foreigners."75  
Proceeding to develop the case in favour of a more thorough education of aspiring 
lawyers, Aikins acknowledged that this would require "adequate rewards for meritorious 
services" and, hence, "Standard Solicitor's Tariffs."76  Even this was presented as being for the 
benefit of society in that it would "create a higher type of barrister and advocate, well skilled in 
the law, gentlemanly in conduct, kindly disposed to his fellow practitioners and of a public 
spirit."77  This was to be reinforced by "the frequent meetings of the members of each of the 
Provincial Bars."  These, "official law and Bar societies" were, he said, invaluable "bulwarks 
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protecting the people against incompetent and unscrupulous men posing as lawyers, and thus 
guarding the honour of the profession."78  
Similarly, and for much the same reasons, it was necessary to clearly demarcate lawyers 
from "unauthorized practitioners."  These latter would not have the same education as lawyers, 
would not be subject to the same ethical codes, and therefore could not be trusted to provide 
competent service to their clientele.   Aikins warned that those "without suitable qualifications 
would batter on a too credulous and unsuspecting public," and called upon the Benchers of the 
various law societies to adopt "the best methods and best ways possible" to "fulfil the statutory 
and traditional obligations cast upon them and protect the profession from encroachment upon its 
sphere."79 
There was a symmetry and mesh of components here, a vision of professionalism cut of 
whole cloth. 
 
Keystone of Social Cohesion 
The rhetoric of service infused professional discourse during and after the Great War.80  
Lawyers were said to be qualified by training, experience, and commitment to service, as "natural 
leaders of the people in public affairs."81   As such they could provide an anti-dote to various 
undesirable ideologies which were then in circulation: 
A special duty rests upon our profession both on the Bench and at the Bar, for we are 
the agents and ministers of the law.... Through a general neglect of that service in our 
country of popular suffrage our people are in imminent danger of the despotism not so 
much of individuals as of classes, organized on the principle of every one for 
himself....82 
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The whole package of legal professionalism was conceived as a bulwark against social unrest, 
despotism, and class warfare.83   It was hoped that "greater unity of the profession would lead to 
the much needed and greater unity in the thought and action among the peoples of Canada and to 
like mindedness and singleness of heart and soul in the interest of our country."84   
Thus, it was cultural revolution first and foremost that Canadian lawyers sought.  The goal 
was to avert political disaster.   More than anything else, the craving for national integration on 
such terms spurred lawyers toward modern "professionalization".  Seeking to avert radical social 
change, they discovered their profession. 
 
Conclusions 
This vision of professionalism resonated at many levels with popular conceptions of 
appropriate social organization.  Ironically, it was imbricated with the very modernity which, in 
other manifestations, its proponents resisted.  This period, this time, and the peculiar 
circumstances relating to the opening of Canada's western empire provided the habitat from 
which emerged the form of professionalism which Canadian lawyers now take for granted.  The 
vision of social life which it incorporates however has little currency in our time or among 
contemporary lawyers.   
The conclusions to be drawn from this can be traced along two axes.  The first is in 
relation to theories of professionalism, the second in relation to wider issues in cultural history.   
 
             i) theories of professionalization 
The theories of professionalization which have enjoyed currency during the past fifty 
years have fallen into functionalist or "rational choice" camps (the latter manifesting itself in both 
"market control" and "work jurisdictions" variants).  Two of the pre-eminent theorists of legal 
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professionalism, Terence Halliday and Lucien Karpik, have described these approaches as 
focussing on (i) the achievement of "a service relationship", (ii) "the monopolistic strategy of 
extracting market rent and thus social privilege", and "the deployment of knowledge for the 
creation and defence of work jurisdictions as a way to define boundaries between work domains".  
Each approach is inadequate, they assert, on account of what each of them overlooks: 
"politics".85 
Certainly, the history of lawyers' professionalization in Canada provides strong support 
for the critique of both functionalist approaches premised on "client-service" and narrowly 
economic interpretations of professionalism.86  The "market control paradigm" and its cousins, 
even when qualified and re-worked to the highest level of sophistication, cannot adequately 
account for the very obvious non-market motivations of legal professionals who struggled to 
create their profession.87  Nor can it account for the very important non-market effects of legal 
professionalism.  Much more is at stake than who gets what portion of the economic pie.  To the 
extent that Canada's legal professionals re-created their profession in an attempt to stave off 
political and social change, to warp discourses of politics and civic life by confining them in 
"acceptable" channels, their project can seem to carry an almost conspiratorial and anti-
democratic import of far greater significance than "market control" ordinarily implies.88 
Canadian lawyers clearly had political objectives of sorts in mind as they went about the 
work outlined above.  Because of this their story might be taken as buttressing an emerging 
interpretive frame which postulates a necessary and causal relationship between lawyering and 
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the rise of western political liberalism.89  There can be little doubt that "the politics of lawyers 
directly engage one of the great ideological and institutional movements of the past several 
centuries - the construction of political liberalism."90  Equally, there can be little doubt that the 
lawyers who created the twentieth century Canadian common law legal professions were 
"liberals" in the broad sense.  They were committed to private property (within limits), individual 
freedom (within limits), laissez-faire (within limits), a moderate state, civil society, and a rights-
based form of citizenship which encompassed both British constitutionalism and the rule of law.  
By the same token however these lawyers do not appear in quite so heroic and unambiguous a 
guise as those who struggled to create political liberalism in more authoritarian places.91  Their 
story points to an unseemly under-side to liberalism which is not always immediately apparent.  
Not all lawyers have played key roles in the overthrow or containment of absolutist regimes and it 
is dangerous to build theory on a few well documented case studies which may turn out to be 
abberational.  Political theorists have properly emphasized that the success of liberal governance 
rests on the preadaptation of subjects to self-governance.  It is dependent, at least in the context of 
large "nation states", on mechanisms of social control which contain difference, Barron's point in 
the quotation which heads this essay.92  Where long-standing tradition or custom does not 
"naturally" contain difference substitutes must be found.  Cultural projects operating through 
temperance societies, welfare, state, education, policing and professions are the result.  Legal 
professionalism, like moral regulation movements, can be a manifestation of "an anxiety of 
freedom that haunts modern liberal forms of rule" where there "is no `natural' system of order."93  
It is important that the developing literatures on lawyers and liberalism take into account this 
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seemingly anti-democratic zone of professional activity, as well as the more obviously "liberal" 
contributions of individual lawyers and (less often) organized legal professions alike. 
 
             i) lawyers' histories and cultural history 
The second general conclusion that might be suggested by the example of legal 
professionalism in twentieth century Canada is with regard to the relationships between 
professional forms and cultures.  In this zone of liberal lawyers' "illiberal" activity it is cultural 
projects which come to the fore.  They do so only in part to advance a political vision as such.   
We do well in this area to heed Alan Hunt's caution against taking conceptual categories too 
seriously: 
We conventionally make distinctions, such as those between social, economic and 
moral realms; such categories are useful, even necessary, so long as we do not fall 
into the trap of imagining that these terms create real separations as if there is some 
field, realm or space that is exclusively social, moral or economic....  Our conceptual 
distinctions are elaborated for analytical purposes only; in the real world they are 
always found in complex connection with other elements.94 
The founding fathers of modern legal professionalism in Canada knew full well that their 
profession, their personal ethics, religion, economic beliefs, and political convictions were bound 
together in some fashion.  It was not an absolutist binding together however.  For some purposes 
Baptists or Jews or Catholics could be tolerated just as in politics disagreements between Liberals 
and Conservatives were both legitimate and genuine.  Nonetheless, a cultural web held the whole 
together and most leading lawyers would have understood the urges which led Michel Foucault to 
describe one project of western states as being to "constitute the populace as a moral subject".95  
This was no idle philosophy in their time and their place.  In common cause with other prominent 
Canadians acting in many realms, it was very much what Canadian lawyers were on about. 
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What is interesting in the work of the legal professions is the extent to which lawyers 
combined agendas which were explicitly moral and reforming with a profound restructuring of 
their profession.  Their efforts to reform the curriculum of formal legal education, for example, is 
not altogether dissimilar from near contemporaneous efforts to introduce public schooling, to 
reform private boys schools, to educate imperial civil servants, or to fashion universities anew so 
as to meet the needs of a changing world.96  Though it is less immediately obvious perhaps with 
resepct to their desire to attain self-regulation, monopoly, professional independence, and plenary 
disciplinary powers, these too were directed to "cultural" ends.  They built structures on cultural 
foundations, drawn to blue-prints of moral origin. 
This, of course, is a limited conclusion.  To assert that Canadian legal professionalism 
originated in cultural projects in the early twentieth century is not to assert that all legal 
professions, everywhere, always have originated in these ways (only imperial centres and 
obviously important places - such as London, New York, Los Angeles, or Paris - can plausibly 
hope to turn their parochialisms into social theory).   
Moreover the argument that structures emerge from deliberate, self-conscious agency 
cannot be made at all places and all times.  Some professional structures may indeed have 
important origins which are lost in the mists of time and others may accrete slowly in ad hoc 
response to periodic crises (the English Bar comes to mind in both categories).  It is also 
undoubtably the case that much cultural, economic, and political change takes place within 
frameworks provided by more or less durable structures.  The late twentieth century legal 
profession, for example, leaves little room for the rhetoric of moral reform.  No contemporary 
lawyer can adopt the role of a "high priest" of law, just as no university law teacher could now 
seriously adopt as his or her mission the inculcation of the virtues of British gentlemanliness. 
Even modestly understood, however, the findings reported here are not de minimis.  They 
direct our attention to questions of cultural agency and structural revolution that are too easily 
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overlooked.  They suggest connections between market control, political lawyering, culture, 
liberalism and professionalism that have yet to be adequately explored. 
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